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Although there is a consensus concerning the need for public policy evaluation, there is no 
stable doctrine regarding the way such assessments should be carried out. Different models 
coexist or succeed one another; it is, for example, possible to schematically oppose a ballistic 
model of evaluation “of the action” to an emergent model of evaluation “in the action”. The 
aim of this article is to analyse the evolution in public policy evaluations and the difficulties 
inherent  in  them  by  studying  the  French  cluster  evaluation  undertaken  in  2008.  This 
evaluation was planned from the beginning as a component of the cluster policy, with the aim 
of modifying the policy in the light of its initial results. 
 
We first put into perspective the doctrines and methodologies underpinning public policy 
evaluation in general and cluster evaluation in particular. We then study the procedures used 
in  the  French  cluster  evaluation,  comparing  them  to  four  international  cases  (Germany, 
Belgium, Finland and Austria). The analysis is based on a detailed examination of documents 
relevant  to  the  evaluation,  on  our  empirical  knowledge  of  the  French  clusters,  and  on 
discussions with territorial and national actors involved in the cluster policy.  
 
The article reveals the inherent difficulties in cluster evaluation processes. These difficulties 
are mostly related to the systemic, multi-actor and heterogeneous characteristics of the object 
“cluster”. Analysing the usage and the effects of the evaluation on the various actors allows us 
to  conclude  that  cluster  evaluation  in  France  is  a  learning  source  for  the  progressive 
construction of a cluster doctrine and a doctrine of its management. The evaluation, grounded 
in an interactive approach, becomes part of a larger process, a knowledge process benefiting 
both the government and the local actors concerned. Integrated from the outset into the cluster 
management  system,  the  evaluation  becomes  a  tool  amongst  others;  it  is  therefore  less 
consistent with a model of objective, incontestable and independent knowledge production 
than with an instrument to help decision-makers forge their choices.  
 





Since Marshall (1920) it has been apparent that geographical concentrations of firms and 
economic actors, known as districts or clusters, can generate positive effects on economic 
growth in specific territories. Marshall’s results are confirmed by the success of clusters like 
Silicon Valley and the Italian districts. Numerous studies (Becattini, 1989; Piore and Sabel, 
1984; Porter, 1998; Rosenberg, 2002; Saxenian, 1994) have highlighted the characteristics 
and advantages of such organisations. 
Such examples of localised organisations have since become paragons of the genre. Most of 
them developed organically with no initial shared strategic vision. In the 1990s, their proven 
track  records  prompted  federal  and  regional  governments  in  most  countries  to  introduce 
cluster  development  policies  designed  to  encourage  the  creation  of  the  kind  of  synergies 
observed in such spontaneously evolving clusters and to generate sources of competitiveness 
in their territories (Saublens, 2007). Even if the concept of clusters remains fuzzy (Markusen, 
2003; Martin and Sunley, 2007), public resources consecrated to such policies are generally 
far from negligible. 
 
A desire to account for the use of such funds, to measure the effects of such policies and 
improve or re-orientate them mean that public authorities are keen to examine the impacts of 
their policies and assess them to ensure that objectives are being met. Over the course of the 
last few years, two approaches to the evaluation of cluster policies have emerged. On the one 
hand, studies have underlined the importance of evaluations in terms of learning and of the 
transmission of knowledge (Potter, 2005). On the other, academics have attempted to develop 
frameworks for evaluating clusters (Colgan and Baker, 2003). Diez (2001) highlighted that 
approaches  to  assessing  clusters  are  changing  and  that  “more  creative  ways”  are  needed. 
Participatory evaluation, he suggests, would be an appropriate way in which to assess the 
specificities  and  characteristics  of  clusters.  Nevertheless,  a  consensus  emerges  from  such 
studies:  evaluating  cluster  policies  is  a  difficult  task  and  precise  measurements  and 
frameworks have yet to be developed. 
 
This  consensus  derives,  notably,  from  the  fact  that  clusters,  and  government-supported 
clusters in particular, only emerged relatively recently. This raises the following questions: 
How  should  clusters  and  cluster  policies  be  assessed?  Is  there  one  particular  evaluation 3 
 
method or does each individual policy require a specific assessment approach? Is it possible 
to propose an evaluation model for public policy concerning clusters? 
 
In order to contribute to current debates on the subject and to propose a series of tentative 
answers to these complex questions, we have based our approach on a comparison between 
various evaluation techniques used in a number of European countries. More precisely, we 
focus  on  the  evaluation  recently  conducted  in  France.  In  2005,  the  French  government 
introduced an ambitious approach to the development of clusters, referred to as the “pôles de 
compétitivité”
*  (“competitiveness  clusters”)  policy.  The  policy  is  designed  to  stimulate 
innovation and competitiveness amongst firms and within territories, principally by means of 
providing financial support to joint R&D projects involving enterprises and research centres. 
Seventy-one competitiveness clusters received official accreditation between 2005 and 2007. 
Accreditation provides the right to apply for a certain number of public subsidies both in 
terms of running the cluster and supporting R&D projects. However, the government has no 
direct  influence  on  the  way  in  which  clusters  are  organised  or  on  their  employees.  All 
seventy-one  French  clusters  were  evaluated  in  2008  within  the  framework  of  a  major 
operation  requested  by  the  government  agencies  responsible  for  overseeing  their 
development. 
 
Working on competitiveness clusters in a multi-disciplinary research team since 2007,
† we 
have  carefully  monitored  the  development,  results  and  effects  of  the  national  evaluation 
carried out in 2008. Moreover, as well as the overall results, we were able to access some of 
the raw material used by the assessors. Furthermore, we repeatedly interacted with the bodies 
responsible for requesting the evaluation and the assessors themselves. This allowed us to 
glean a greater understanding of the issues at play in the evaluation, the methodology applied 
and the way in which the results were presented. Lastly, we interviewed the directors of the 
clusters  to  ask  them  about  their  impressions  of  the  evaluation  process.  Moreover,  other 
European governments, which introduced cluster policies, also produced evaluations. After 
reviewing the literature, we chose four cases (Germany, Finland, Belgium, Austria) which 
appeared to us to be significant and which were sufficiently well documented to be able to 
                                                 
* Throughout the article, “pôles de compétitivité” or “competitiveness clusters” will be referred to using the 
generic term “clusters”. 
† The authors belong to a team of researchers in management and economics funded by the Agence Nationale de 
Recherche (French National Research Agency) and ESCP Europe (a business school). They use a variety of 
approaches including empirical work (both qualitative and statistical) on certain clusters or certain themes linked 
to clusters.  4 
 
provide elements of comparison with the French evaluation. In Austria, in addition to the 
literature review, we were able to interview the directors of clusters about the way evaluations 
were carried out there. 
 
After  outlining  the  issues  and  problematics  inherent  in  all  evaluations,  particularly  those 
concerning cluster policies (Section 2), we provide a detailed presentation of the evaluation of 
cluster policy carried out in France in 2008 in order to identify the approaches used and the 
difficulties encountered therein (Section 3). We then present four examples of foreign cluster 
evaluations (Section 4) analysed using the same methodology as that applied to the French 
case. We will then compare those evaluations with the French situation in order to assess 
whether they are based on a shared methodology and whether they present similarities in 
terms of the questions asked, the definitions of the parameters of the object evaluated, the 
difficulties encountered, and the use made of the evaluations (Section 5). Lastly, we will 
conclude that, even if the various evaluation approaches do have points in common, there is 





The emergence of cluster policies in a large number of countries can be explained fairly 
easily:  Schematically,  in  a  context  in  which  international  competition  is  exacerbated  by 
globalisation and in which developed countries have witnessed a growing trend for first their 
production  and  then  their  R&D  capacities  to  delocalise  towards  emerging  countries,  the 
success of a number of spontaneously developing clusters, the primary example of which is 
Silicon Valley (Weil, 2010), has prompted governments to employ a voluntaristic approach to 
supporting the emergence and development of clusters. A range of theoretical studies (for a 
literature  review  see  Fen  Chong,  2009)  have  demonstrated  that  all  such  policies  involve 
substantial public investment (public funding, tax breaks, etc.). Factors explaining for the 
increase in the number of evaluations requested by governments include a desire to account 
for the use of such funds and to measure the effects of such policies, to improve and re-
orientate the policy, as well as to annihilate persistent doubts about the impact of clusters on 
economic growth (Martin and Sunley, 2003; J. Potter and Miranda, 2009; Torre, 2008). 
 5 
 
2.1. The current debate on the evaluation of public policies   
 
It is not our intention to provide either a detailed overview of the history of the evaluation of 
public policy in France (Theonig, 2002) or discuss the various theoretical tenets underpinning 
different conceptions of evaluation (Chanut, 2009; Stame, 2009). We will content ourselves 
with noting that in France, after an influx of American research approaches in the 1970s, 
evaluation  developed  in  a  timid  manner  before  being  institutionalised  by  a  decree 
promulgated in 1990 which, however, did not entirely guarantee its primacy. Thus, even if a 
certain number of evaluations were carried out in France after the decree, observers were 
nevertheless critical about the breadth and scope of such practices.   
 
Evaluating public policy consists in “examining the efficiency of the policy by comparing 
results  to  pre-defined  objectives  and  the  resources  used  to  achieve  them”  (Decree  of 
18/11/1998). Beyond this apparently clear definition lurk a number of relatively well-known 
difficulties or dilemmas exist. We will content ourselves with listing them briefly below:  
•  Formulating objectives is rarely simple, and the work of assessors often consists in 
elaborating questions pertinent to specific policies. 
•  Evaluations are carried out at different times in the lifespan of a policy – ex ante, ex 
post, ex itinere – a fact which considerably modifies their status, their relevance, and 
the use that can potentially be made of them. This range of approaches implies various 
choices and constraints, many of them political in nature.  
•  The  methods  used,  however  rigorous  they  may  be,  cannot  be  purely  quantitative. 
Narrowly positivist approaches are eschewed. They are thus informed by methods 
derived from the social sciences, even though the results generated by such techniques 
are, in a certain regard, relatively subjective. What kind of balance should be struck 
between quantitative and qualitative methods? 
•  Although the participation of various stakeholders, notably end users or beneficiaries, 
constitutes a source of knowledge, evaluations cannot be transformed into negotiating 
tools; in other words, the conclusions reached by evaluators cannot be reduced to the 
status of expressions of compromise. How can the two objectives be reconciled?  
•  The interaction between an evaluation and its ramifications is a complex phenomenon; 
advocates of the evaluative approach had eventually to admit that it could by no means 
be considered of central importance to the political or administrative decision-making 6 
 
process  (Lacasee,  1995).  In  fact,  few  changes  are  made  to  policies  as  a  result  of 
evaluations, the effects of which tend to be diffuse and indirect.   
 
These  questions  could,  depending  on  the  answers  elicited  by  them,  play  a  role  in  the 
renunciation of a model termed by some “ballistic” (Pardioleau, 1982) or “epidemiological” 
(Stame, 2009) in which evaluation is seen as the last link in the chain of a process of public 
action designed to be sequential and linear where the series “objectives-means-results” is 
followed by a corrective phase made possible by a rigorous process of objective evaluation. 
 
For some authors, the French paradigm is, to use the terminology developed by Chanut (2009) 
characterised by assessment “in” rather than “of” action, which, amongst other things, renders 
evaluation  a  quasi-continuous,  rather  than  specifically  ex  post  process,  thus  blurring  the 
boundaries  between  evaluation  and  management  or  management  control  and  shifting 
responsibility for assessment from the “experts” to the managers themselves. Nevertheless, as 
we will see in terms of the evaluation of cluster policy in a sample of four different countries 
as well as in France itself, the distinction between the two paradigms is not always quite so 
clear. Indeed, the doctrines governing evaluation tend to vary. 
 
 
 2.2. How should a cluster policy be evaluated? 
 
The  need  for  evaluation  having  been  established,  the  question  remains  what  should  be 
assessed and how?
‡ In order to outline the principal approaches to evaluation, we will refer to 
the report published by the BIPE
§ on behalf of the DIACT
** in 2007 (BIPE, 2007). The 
report, designed to help the DIACT prepare the evaluation of French clusters, contains a 
summary of the various approaches to assessment applied abroad.  
 
2.2.1. What should be evaluated?  
One  of  the  traditional  difficulties  involved  in  evaluating  public  policy  is  the  variety  of 
potential angles of attack hidden by the term “evaluation”. Specialists habitually distinguish at 
                                                 
‡ We have made use of a comparative bibliographical study on the subject conducted by Lefebvre & Pallez 
(2009) for the Chair of Entrepreneurship of the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Indstry. 
§ The BIPE is an economic and strategic consultancy firm (www.bipe.com; consulted on 15/07/2010) 
** «  Délégation  interministérielle  à  l’aménagement  et  la  compétitivité  des  territoires »  (DIACT)  (« Inter-
Ministerial Delegation for Regional Development and the Development of Competition ») functioned from 2005 
to 2009. Before 2005, the delegation was known as the DATAR (« Délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à 
l’action régionale »,  or « Delegation for Territorial and Regional Development »). 7 
 
least five notions characterising public policy: relevance, coherence, efficacity, efficiency and 
systemic impact. The question of “performance” refers directly to the notion of efficiency in 
terms of the degree to which the objectives outlined in the policy have been attained. But it 
also refers to the notion of relevance (in that any examination of performance inevitably poses 
question about “action theory”, the theory underlying the policy) and to the notion of systemic 
impacts (the effects could be a good deal more wide-ranging than those identified a priori). 
 
In so far as cluster policies are concerned, it is possible to distinguish a number of different 
levels of evaluation partially linked to these general notions as well as to actors with different 
interests: 
•  Firstly, the efficiency of cluster policies at the national level as opposed to the impacts 
of a given cluster. 
•  Secondly, those interested in evaluating clusters can distinguish: results in relation to 
the aspired objectives, organisational efficiency (projects, governance, piloting, etc.), 
the impact of individual clusters on the territories in which they are located and on the 
economic  dynamic  of  those  territories,  the  impact  of  clusters  on  their  actors 
(enterprises, research, local authorities) or the results of certain projects and initiatives 
carried out within clusters.   
 
As is illustrated by the graph below, these various elements are not independent of each other. 
The graph succinctly outlines the difference between evaluating a cluster policy and assessing 
the cluster (from the perspective of the way in which they are organised, the results they 
produce, and their impacts). In spite of its simplistic character, the graph also reveals the 
potential determinants of the results achieved by clusters, which can be linked to the public 
policy  in  question,  to  internal  organisation,  and  to  external  factors.  In  addition  to  these 
explanatory factors, clusters also possess “inherited” characteristics which are not apparent in 
the BIPE schema. By the term “inherited” we mean the configuration of the actors concerned, 
the kind of resources available, and the links between the various actors and the territory prior 







Graph 1: Levels of evaluation of an innovative cluster 
 
Source: BIPE (p.6, 2007) 
 
These remarks provide an insight into the variety of approaches to the evaluation of clusters 
around the world. The graph also highlights the fact that the evaluation (or self-assessment)
†† 
of the organisational efficiency of clusters, on which emphasis is often placed, is merely one 
of the many factors enabling us to assess cluster policies.   
 
2.2.2. Who requests the evaluation and when?  
Evaluations are undertaken on the request of particular actors at specific times. These two 
variables (the origin and time of the request) influence the nature of evaluations to the degree 
that the nature of the questions posed differs according to the type of actor and the phase of 
development of the cluster. Most evaluations of cluster policies are carried out at the initiative 
of  the  public  actors  responsible  for  developing  and  funding  those  policies.  Moreover,  in 
France – and this is also true for other countries – the evaluation was carried out at a relatively 
early stage in the development of the policy. 
 
2.2.3.What methodology, which indicators? 
One  of  the  difficulties  inherent  in  approaches  to  evaluation  examined  in  this  study  is 
described below: 
•  In theory, evaluations should be carried out in view of objectives defined ex ante, on 
the  basis  of  a  comparison  with  a  point  of  reference,  which  is  itself  defined  and 
characterised prior to the introduction of the policy. 
                                                 
†† Sometimes referred to as an “audit”. 9 
 
•  In practice it can be observed that, generally speaking, the networks of actors in a 
cluster were already in place, that the development dynamic already existed in an 
embryonic form, and that the objectives of the cluster change over time. These factors 
render  all  evaluations  delicate.  This  is  particularly  true  in  terms  of  introducing 
additional elements to the policy.   
Consequently, many evaluations use ex post methodologies (in which results are not assessed 
on the basis of initial objectives). Such evaluations are rarely normative and as prospective as 
they are retrospective. 
 
The  criteria  used  to  evaluate  clusters  generally  focus  on  organisation  and  results.  The 
operational efficiency of clusters is judged on the basis indicators such as the “number and 
cost of projects supported”, and scientific and technological performance by the “number of 
patents  and  licences  generated.”  Meanwhile,  economic  performance  is  gauged  by  highly 
traditional indicators covering the growth and health of firms (turnover, added value, exports), 
as well as job creation, enterprise creation, and direct investment within the territory. More 
“intermediary” results-based indicators are often applied: funds dedicated to R&D projects, 
total investment. 
 
After  having  provided  a  general  outline  to  the  approaches  characterising  cluster  policy 
evaluations, we will now present a specific case – the evaluation carried out in France in 2008 





We  will  present  the  answers  to  the  generic  questions  previously  asked  about  French 
competitiveness cluster policy in two sections: 
-  Firstly, we will describe the way in which the approach was elaborated: the sponsor, 
the evaluation itself, the methodology used, the nature of the results, etc.  
-  We will then analyse the way in which the results of the evaluation were used and 




3.1. Evaluating clusters: a presentation 
 
In  France,  cluster  policy,  unlike  a  number  of  previous  policies,  integrates  the  issue  of 
evaluation from the very outset. The State had decided to evaluate its ambitious and costly 
policy,
‡‡ introduced in 2005, after three years, with a view to using the results, if necessary, to 
modify the initial doctrine. Although not entirely original,
§§ this particularity is nevertheless 
worth pointing out. Which approach was then selected by the French State, the sponsor of the 
evaluation? 
 
All  evaluation  approaches  presuppose  that  objectives  should  be  defined  and  appropriate 
methods  and  indicators  selected.  After  establishing  a  list  of  specifications  based  on  the 
framework provided by the BIPE (see above), the DIACT launched a call for tender in 2007. 
The  tender  was  won  by  two  consultancy  firms,  CM  International  (CMI)  and  the  Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG). 
 
The mission of the two consultancy firms consisted in providing an analysis of the strategic 
orientation of national policy and gauging the efficiency of the approach, cluster by cluster, in 
each of the country’s seventy-one clusters. The ambitious nature of the mission should be 
noted. The evaluation focused on three major themes: the policy’s relevance/coherence, the 
way in which it was implemented, and its initial effects (it should be observed that, in view of 
the  fact  that  the  policy  been  introduced  so  recently,  the  assessors  regarded  its  economic 
impact of only secondary importance). Meanwhile, the evaluation of the seventy-one clusters 
was  based  on  the  analysis  of  three  factors:  their  dynamic,  the  way  in  which  they  were 
structured,  and  their  R&D  projects.  Satisfactory,  mediocre  and  insufficient  results  were 
defined for each field.  
 
The  methodology  encompassed  the  analysis  of  documentary  sources,  interviews,  and 
meetings with the actors and organisations concerned, as well as a qualitative and quantitative 
survey carried out by means of questionnaires sent to the clusters prior to the interviews, 
which were effected by means of a formalised procedure in order to ensure that they were 
comparable and to guarantee that the evaluation was balanced. In total, over one thousand 
                                                 
‡‡ The clusters were funded to the tune of 1.5 billion euros over the course of three years. Most of the money was 
spent on supporting joint R&D projects.  




*** were interviewed. The questionnaire was established on the basis of a test carried 
out on four “pilot” organisations designed to take into account the diversity of the country’s 
seventy-one  competitiveness  clusters.  The  operation  was  closely  monitored  by  the  bodies 
requesting  the  evaluation,  which  made  it  possible  to  modify  the  methodology  and  the 
questions  asked  on  an  ongoing  basis.  The  process  included  a  weekly  meeting  with  the 
DIACT, frequent contacts with the DGE,
††† a monthly inter-ministerial committee, a steering 
committee which met every two or three months, etc. The results of the evaluation were 
presented to the steering committee in June 2008 after which a government press release was 
immediately published. The summary documents were posted on the Internet and feedbacks 
were given to each cluster in the form of “contradictory interviews”. 
 
The principal conclusion of CM International and the BCG was that the “organisation of 
competitiveness clusters seems to be sufficiently promising to warrant a continuation of the 
general outlines of the policy” (p. 2, CM International and BCG, 2008). Nevertheless, it was 
recommended that (a) the actors of the clusters should assume more responsibility; (b) project 
funding mechanisms should be optimised to ensure a greater degree of coherence; (c) cluster 
policy should be integrated more closely with overall research policy; and (d) the strategic 
piloting  of  the  approach  should  be  further  developed.  In  terms  of  the  evaluation  of  the 
individual clusters, the evaluation recommended a three-tier classification based on three key 
areas (strategy, governance, and the capacity to develop R&D projects): 
 
•  Clusters (39) which had “attained the objectives of the cluster policy” 
•  Clusters (19) which “had partially attained the objectives of the cluster policy and 
which must focus on making improvements in certain areas” 
•  Clusters (13) which “could benefit from making thoroughgoing changes.”  
 
In total, over 80% of the French clusters either totally or partially attained their objectives. 
After these conclusions were drawn, the government took a certain number of decisions
‡‡‡ 
                                                 
*** 296 nationally and 720 in the clusters (an average of 10 per cluster). 
††† « Direction générale des Entreprises » (DGE) or « General Directorate for enterprises ». The DGE is part of 
the Minister of the Economy, Industry and Employment. « The role of the DGE is to prepare and implement 
French policy to enhance business competitiveness, stimulate innovation, and develop the information society 
within  a  European  and  international  Framework. »  (http://www.industrie.gouv.fr/portail/une/missionbr.html 
consulted on 02/08/2010). 
‡‡‡  For  a  summary,  see  the  summary  of  the  Cluster  Observatory  Seminar  (session  of  October  21,  2008) : 
« Retour  sur  l'évaluation  nationale  des  pôles  de  compétitivité »  presented  by  CMI,  BCG  and  DIACT) 
(http://observatoirepc.org/) 12 
 
which constituted what has come to be known as Cluster Policy 2.0. We will discuss those 
decisions in Chapter V. For the moment, the close links between the results of the evaluation 
and the introduction of the second phase of the policy should be noted.  
 
 
3.2. How was the evaluation used?  
 
Evaluations are only of any real value if they raise questions about the way forward. Now, the 
French State is often criticised for inadequately evaluating its policies and, in any case, of not 
following up those evaluations it does carry out (Duranton, 2007). How have evaluations been 
used by the various stakeholders and what effects have they had? We will initially examine 
the State’s appropriation of the results of evaluations before analysing the potential effects of 
those  evaluations  on  clusters  and  then,  finally,  considering  the  lessons  learned  for  the 
following evaluation.  
 
3.2.1. An evaluation whose function is to reorient policy  
We have already noted that this evaluative approach is a part of a generalised trend which has 
made the act of “giving an account of oneself” both an integral part of economic life (Dumez, 
2008) and, in terms of public policy, of democratic life. It therefore comes as little surprise 
that the CMI-BCG evaluation carried out by CMI BCG was followed by other “evaluations” 
requested,  successively,  by  the  two  chambers  of  the  French  parliament  (the  Assemblée 
Nationale and the Senate), as well as by the Cour des Comptes, the French national auditing 
body. These various initiatives led, amongst other things, to the conclusion that more precise 
indicators were required in the relatively traditional perspective of “end” results (job creation, 
for example).  
 
The CMI-BCG evaluation, carried out at the request of administrative bodies responsible for 
overseeing the clusters, seems to us to be of a different nature. Even though the political 
communication  concerning  the  results  generated  by  the  cluster  policy  was  of  course  an 
important objective, the process of the evaluation was also explicitly developed as an element 
for piloting the cluster. We will outline how that was translated in practice. 
 
The French President announced the principle of renewing cluster policy a year earlier, in 
June 2007. Nevertheless, the evaluation demonstrated the relevance of the approach in terms 13 
 
of  providing  the  actors  involved  with  an  adequate  structure  and  developing  a  territorial 
strategy, and prompted the State to confirm that its policy would be extended for a further 
three years, with the initial budget of 1.5 billion euros renewed.  
 
Although the decision to extend the national competitiveness cluster policy cannot be imputed 
to the evaluation, certain modifications can be. Based on the results of the evaluation, it was 
decided to introduce changes to the original policy, thereby commencing a phase known as 
“Version  2.0”.  Without  attributing  the  modifications  to  the  State’s  role  in  piloting  the 
programme solely to the evaluation’s recommendations – there were numerous interactions 
between the clusters and representatives of the State – it is undeniable that some of the newly 
introduced approaches directly exploit the results of the evaluation. We will comment on two 
of these approaches which, in our view, are significant.
§§§ 
 
-  The formalisation of the strategy 
The evaluation highlights the clusters’ weakness in terms of elaborating and formalising their 
strategies. In consequence, the State requested the clusters to draw up a series of road maps 
and implement a contract between the State, the local authorities and the individual clusters. 
The aim of the road maps was to present the strategy of individual clusters and provide a basis 
for the development of the multi-annual performance contracts in which the cluster undertook 
to  implement  strategic  objectives  and  action  programmes,  as  well  as  target  agendas  and 
indicators  designed  to  monitor  results.  The  bodies  overseeing  the  programme  thus 
demonstrated a desire to provide a more precise framework for the development of clusters 
compared to the initial phase in which the objectives of individual clusters were relatively 
vague. 
 
-  Implementing indicators  
The insistence on developing indicators is particularly interesting in that it reveals the State’s 
concern  with  future  evaluations.  These  indicators  are  to  be  implemented  by  the  clusters 
themselves and delivered to the State on a yearly basis, thus providing an annual report and 
facilitating  the  evaluation  of  all  seventy-one  clusters.  An  initial  series  of  around  thirty 
                                                 
§§§  In  particular,  we  will  abstain  from  examining  one  of  the  axes  of  the  new  policy,  which  consists  in 
encouraging clusters to contribute to the development of an “innovation and growth ecosystem” by working to 
create closer links with various external partners, notably those combining research and innovation, such as the 
PRES (Research and Tertiary Education Clusters), the RTRA (Theme-Based Advanced Research Networks) and 
the Carnot Institutes.  14 
 
indicators  are  applicable  to  all  clusters  (enterprise  creation,  the  number  of  R&D  projects 
receiving public funding, number of patents lodged, etc.). These indicators should make it 
easier to compare individual clusters. But the State has also taken the diversity of clusters into 
account by requesting that each one of them provide specific indicators in order to assess their 
development relative to their own characteristics.  
 
This twin-pronged approach to evaluation (inter cluster-comparison and the evaluation of the 
clusters’ internal dynamics) reveals an important evolution in the doctrine: the model of a 
“good cluster” to which all clusters should strive has been abandoned; on the contrary, in 
order to make it possible to analyse the dynamics of individual clusters in function of their 
specificities,  the  management  structures  of  the  clusters  themselves  are  invited  to  provide 
relevant indicators. It could even be said that by means of these indicators new schemas of 
causality could be suggested by results generated by the clusters.  
 
In any case, these modifications can be interpreted as the result of a learning process on the 
part of the bodies responsible for oversight, obtained notably through the evaluation process, 
enabling them to access knowledge which was unavailable to them at the time at which the 
policy was originally launched. Knowledge that can be summarily described in the following 
terms: a recognition of the existence of the clusters’ diversified development approaches, and 
a range of shared indicators adjudged to be relevant; and the affirmation of the link between 
the development dynamic and the detailed formulation of a strategy which the clusters are 
then encouraged to establish through formal contracts.  
 
3.2.2. An evaluation designed to mobilise the clusters  
The  evaluation  can  also  directly  affect  the  clusters.  In  effect,  through  the  knowledge  of 
individual clusters that it provides, and the comparisons made possible by it, the evaluation 
can sanction, pilot and mobilise the clusters. It is worthwhile analysing the position taken by 
the State in this regard.  
 
The most visible effect of the evaluation is the division of the clusters into three different 
categories. The classification, which separates the clusters which have fulfilled the objectives 
from those which have not, was to a certain degree perceived as a sanction by the thirteen 
clusters classified in Category C. On the other hand, the classification symbolically rewards 
clusters  regarded  as  “good  students.”  As  is  the  case  with  all  classifications,  the  clusters 15 
 
receiving  most  criticism  questioned  the  relevance  of  the  criteria  used.  For  example,  the 
competitiveness of certain clusters was said to be less dependent on radical technological 
innovations than on use-based innovations (e.g. the Child cluster) or on the availability of a 
labour force equipped with specialist skills and on the organisation of the industrial landscape 
(e.g. the Burgundy Nuclear Cluster). These clusters considered that the assessment to which 
they had been subjected did not adequately take into account their specificities.   
 
For the bodies responsible for oversight, various attitudes to the results of the evaluation 
could  be  envisaged.  A  decision  to  sanction  under-performers  could  have  been  taken 
immediately; “bad” clusters could have been disaccredited, and an emphasis placed on more 
efficient ones. Inversely, the authorities could have chosen to do nothing, hoping instead that 
poorly  performing  clusters  would  have  been  scared  into  action  by  the  results  of  the 
evaluation. It seems that the State opted for a compromise solution by offering clusters with 
poor evaluations a year in which to reorganise and restructure. In fact, this transitional period 
was eventually extended to almost two years. However, in May 2010, it was announced that 
six of the thirteen Category C clusters had had their accreditation revoked.   
 
Initially,  this  position  had  a  number  of  interesting  effects.
****  Once  the  initial  period  of 
misunderstanding  had  passed,  Category  C  clusters  began  to  modify  their  strategy  and 
operational approaches. Clearly, this attitude was informed by the credible threat of having 
their accreditation revoked, a serious symbolic sanction with potentially grave consequences 
within  the  territory  in  which  the  cluster  was  located  (increased  risks  of  delocalisation, 
negative  effects  on  the  morale  of  private  actors,  researchers  deciding  to  focus  on  more 
academic subjects, etc.). It should be added – and this may appear strange to foreign observers 
– that the importance accorded to accreditation is probably a deep-seated characteristic of 
French national culture, where marks of excellence handed down by the State are held in 
extremely high regard. Nevertheless, in France, the consequences of this type of accreditation 
are more than merely symbolic. 
 
By taking such an approach, the authorities played on the “sunshine regulation” effect, simply 
publishing the results (including an implicit comparison with other clusters), albeit strongly 
advising Category C clusters to “put their house in order” within a certain timeframe or they 
                                                 
**** Nevertheless, it is clear that this waiting phase lasted too long. 16 
 
will risk serious consequences. More generally, even in the case of A and B Category clusters, 
the observations of assessors and the publicity generated by the results encouraged a more 
critical attitude which, in some cases, led to certain operational approaches being called into 
question. This is hardly surprising in view of the fact that a further evaluation, based on the 
results of the 2008 assessment, will be carried out in 2012. 
 
3.2.3. Are there lessons to be drawn in view of future evaluations? 
Can lessons be drawn in terms of future evaluations? It seems that the evaluation recently 
carried  out  in  France  could  have  far-reaching  consequences  in  two  areas,  namely  an 
objectivisation of the judgments made by evaluators, and a recognition of the diversity of the 
country’s clusters. 
 
-  The objectivisation of judgments 
In terms of the objectivisation of data and the inherent rigour of the method applied, the 
development of route maps and performance contracts should make the next evaluation easier 
in that objectives will be more clearly formulated and normalised indicators will have been 
defined. Furthermore, the first evaluation will provide a reference point making it possible to 
objectivise the notion of trajectory. The process is increasingly characterised by norms and 
routines, which should improve the quality of future evaluations.  
 
The reliability of data is set to become an even more central issue in that, in future, the 
clusters will provide a certain amount of the information on which they will be evaluated. 
Even  if  there  is  some  risk  in  this  regard,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  offset  by  the 
advantages accruing from economies made in the collection of data and the virtuous circles 
created within clusters by this obligation. Furthermore, a comparison of quantitative data from 
the point of view of the actors, which should be rendered systematic by the oversight bodies 
with a view to ensuring reliability, could in itself be a source of knowledge, notably in terms 
of reinventing schemas of causality explaining performance. But such an approach implies a 
less positivist conception of truth, focusing as it does on “not unlikely” truths. 
 
-  More effectively taking the diversity of clusters into account  
Futhermore, as has been pointed out above, one of the issues of future evaluations will be to 
take into account the diversity of clusters. Comparisons should be made within homogeneous 17 
 
categories in which comparability between clusters in terms of development trajectories has 
been confirmed. The data collected by CMI and BCG could be used to create such categories. 
On what basis should these categories be constructed? Traditionally, differences are primarily 
described in terms of the sectors to which various clusters belong. But the wealth of data 
collected during the initial evaluation should make it possible to go beyond such simple and 
intuitive typologies. For example, Colgan and Baker (2003) suggest dividing the clusters of 
the  state  of  Maine  in  the  United  States  into  three  groups.  According  to  the  authors,  this 
classification, based on the nature of the resources used by clusters (technological, natural, 
others) makes it possible to differentiate between them and improve the way in which they are 
piloted by the public authorities.  
 
Using the databases built up by the CMI-BCG assessors and the Observatoir des Sciences et 
des  Techniques,  we  have  begun  to  develop  our  own  typologies.  For  example,  our  initial 
analyses revealed substantial differences in terms of the “heritage” of competitiveness clusters 
– notably in terms of the R&D potential of the territories in which they are based – which 
could explain the diversity of projects undertaken and results obtained. In effect, projects set 
up by clusters with different R&D potentials cannot a priori be considered identical. By 
applying the hypothesis that, in certain development schemas, R&D projects are an essential 
source of innovation, these data could be used to compare the development dynamics of 
different clusters.  
 
It thus seems that evaluations led to the formulation of new questions of great importance in 





We will illustrate below the approaches and challenges involved in evaluations by means of 
examples drawn from four European countries: Germany, Finland, Belgium and Austria. In 
reference  to  these  examples,  we  will  both  demonstrate  the  diversity  of  objectives  and  of 
methodologies applied to evaluations and outline the recommendations generated by them. 
We will briefly describe the emergence of cluster policies in the four countries before moving 18 
 
on to characterise the various approaches applied to carrying out evaluations.  A comparison 
with the French case will be presented in Chapter V.  
 
4.1. THE EMERGENCE OF CLUSTER POLICIES IN BELGIUM, GERMANY, FINLAND AND 
AUSTRIA  
The cluster policy introduced in the Belgian region of Wallonia in 2000 (Lepage, 2009) is 
intended to encourage the emergence of corporate networks by means of a subsidy primary 
aimed at covering running costs.
†††† Granted annually for a period of three years, the 160,000 
euros subsidies are gradually reduced from the fourth year on. Four pilot clusters
‡‡‡‡ were 
selected  in  2001  on  an  experimental  basis,  and  in  2004,  an  intermediary  evaluation  was 
carried out.  
 
In  Finland,  the  debate  concerning  the  need  for  a  cluster  policy  was  triggered  by  the 
publication of the article “The Competitive Advantage of Nations” (1990) by Michael Porter 
(Pentikäinen 2000). Eight cluster programmes were eventually introduced in 1997 (Rouvinen 
and  Ylä-Anttila  1999).  They  were  provided  with  subsidies  to  support  R&D  programmes 
based on general criteria such as the importance of joint-projects and strengthening links 
between the public and private sectors. The first evaluation of those programmes was carried 
out in 2000 (Pentikäinen 2000). 
 
In  the  mid-1990s,  Germany  made  the  transition  from  a  traditional  industrial  policy  to  a 
cluster-based industrial policy (Dohse, 2007). An initial selection was made in 1996 on the 
basis  of  a  national  “competition”  –  BioRegio  –  in  the  field  of  biotechnology.  Other 
competitions  of  the  same  type  (for  example,  BioProfile)  followed.  Three  regions  were 
selected  at  the  BioRegio  competition,
§§§§  each  of  them  receiving  50  million  DM 
(approximately 26 million euros) to be spent on developing R&D projects over a five-year 
period (Staehler et al. 2007). But the federal government left the governments of the Länders 
with a good deal of leeway in terms of implementing cluster policy in their respective regions. 
An ex-post evaluation of the BioRegio and BioProfile competitions was carried out between 
2005 and 2007.  
 
                                                 
†††† Since 2007, specific subsidies have been granted with a view to increasing the number of joint projects (see 
Lepage 2009). 
‡‡‡‡ Aeronautics, Auto-mobilité, Wood and Agro-Food Biotechnologies. 
§§§§ Munich, the Rhineland, and the Rhine–Neckar Triangle. 19 
 
In Austria, responsibility for cluster policy falls to the regional governments rather than to the 
federal government.
 ***** Since the 1990s,
††††† each of the country’s regions has developed its 
own  clusters.  The  majority  of  regional  financial  support  is  targeted  at  encouraging  the 
structural development of clusters and the services they provide rather than at major research 
projects,  which  continue  to  depend  on  traditional  sources  of  support.  Lower  Austria,
‡‡‡‡‡ 
which  has  created  six  clusters  since  2001,  is  the  region  we  studied  in  most  detail.  The 
management structure of each cluster operates under the umbrella of the regional economic 
agency, EcoPlus. Two of the major objectives of cluster management in Lower Austria are to 
boost the competitiveness of local SMEs and to help them break into new markets (by means 
of joint national and international projects). In 2004, EcoPlus requested an initial independent 
evaluation of its cluster policy (Kalcher, Piber, & Gruber, 2004) with a view to improving its 
original approach.  
 
 
4.2. FOUR EVALUATION APPROACHES  
 
We  will  now  briefly  describe  the  four  approaches  to  evaluation  using  the  same  type  of 
questions posed in Chapter II:  
•  The bodies requesting the evaluations: The four evaluations were each carried out for 
the governmental authorities responsible for instigating the policy.  
•  The  time  at  which  the  evaluation  is  carried  out:  The  German  evaluation  is 
considerably different regarding the Finish, Belgium and Austrian evaluation in terms 
of when it was carried out. In fact, German clusters were evaluated ten years after they 
had been set up, a fact which made it possible to assess the programme’s economic 
results (added value, for example). In Finland, Belgium and Austria, evaluations were 
carried out within three years of the programme having been set up, with a resultant 
emphasis on an assessment of the programme itself. 
•  The  object  of  the  evaluation:  Our  analysis  of  clusters  outside  France  reveals  the 
diversity  of  the  subjects  evaluated.  In  effect,  in  the  four  cases  studied,  assessors 
focused on cluster policy. In Germany and Wallonia, economic performance was also 
                                                 
***** … even if the national government has recently began to place greater emphasis on coordinating regional 
initiatives.  
††††† In 1995, Styria became the first Austrian region to develop cluster initiatives. 
‡‡‡‡‡ In this paper, it is to this region that we refer whenever Austria is mentioned.  20 
 
measured. Lastly, in Wallonia and Austria, organisational aspects and the services 
offered by the clusters’ management were also evaluated.  
•  Methodological  choices:  German  assessors  opted  for  a  comparison  with  a  control 
group (regions which were not being subsidised), while the three other evaluations 
featured qualitative and quantitative data and were more descriptive in nature.  
 
4.3.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS:  THE  LINK  WITH  THE  DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS 
German evaluators found that the BioRegio and BioProfile competitions encountered a good 
deal  of  success  in  terms  of  enterprise  creation,  job  creation  and  international  visibility. 
Placing  an  emphasis  on  the  “end”  results,  they  recommended  a  continuation  of  the 
“competition” - based policy designed to distribute funds to the most promising projects. In 
this  regard,  assessors  are  in  line  with  the  tested  doctrine  of  such  programmes  based  on 
selection and incentives.  
 
Evaluators of the Finnish programme focused on describing its shortcomings, highlighting the 
fact that private companies were loath to become involved, probably because it was run by a 
public body. Furthermore, the evaluators noted that most of the budget was allocated to short-
term projects. Consequently, no long-term collaborative projects were developed. Hertog and 
Remoe (2001) pointed out that approximately one in three joint-projects had been set up with 
the sole aim of receiving public funding. 
 
In  terms  of  the  selection  of  cluster  projects,  the  evaluators  of  the  Belgian  programme 
recommended focusing on the most promising programmes. Nevertheless, rather than scoring 
the clusters hierarchically, they presented a detailed evaluation of each individual cluster. The 
Wallonian government eventually took the decision to stop funding two of the region’s four 
clusters.   
 
The  evaluators  of  the  Austrian  programme  focused  above  all  on  the  services  offered  by 
clusters.  For  example,  they  recommended  that  initiatives  should  not  only  be  more  wide-
ranging the older the cluster was, but also that they should reflect client needs. They also 
recommended that knowledge accumulated by clusters should be developed and rendered 
more accessible, both for Ecoplus and for member companies (for example, what problems 
are faced by individual groups of enterprises?). Furthermore, they highlighted the need for 21 
 
more inter-firm cooperation and for closer links with national research funds, especially the 
TIP  (the  research  and  consulting  programme  for  Austria's  research,  technology  and 
innovation policy). 
 
Evaluators’ recommendations varied in tone and had differing direct effects on the decision 





After this brief outline of approaches to evaluation employed in four European countries, we 
will now return to the French case, pointing out and comparing a number of characteristics. 
By  means  of  this  analysis  we  will  attempt  to  identify  similarities  and  differences  in 
approaches to evaluating clusters.   
 
Divergences have already become apparent. In France and Belgium as well as, to a certain 
degree, in Germany, the evaluation of the policy is based on the evaluation of the cluster, 
which provides information about how the policy has been implemented. In Finland, only the 
policy is evaluated, while in Austria emphasis is placed on the services provided by clusters. 
We will therefore examine the various facets of evaluation by analysing the following points: 
-  Difficulties inherent in objectivation. 
-  Questions concerning the interpretation of results. 
-  The question of the diversity of clusters. 
-  The link between evaluations and political decisions. 
 
 
5.1. The question of objectivation      
 
The various examples of cluster policy evaluation reveal the existence of ongoing problems 
concerning both the reliability of data
§§§§§ and of issues concerning measurement: numerous 
                                                 
§§§§§ In France, an analysis of the funding received by clusters reveals the problem of reliability. Later analyses 
have shown discrepancies between the information provided by clusters and the data held in the IT systems of 
the funding bodies.  22 
 
phenomena are either not measured, badly measured, insufficiently measured or difficult to 
measure.   
Firstly, some of the phenomena observed can only be analysed qualitatively, which implies 
problems  in  terms  of  objectivation  and  comparability.  How,  for  example,  should  the 
operational aspects of a cluster be measured? 
 
But,  even  when  a  phenomenon  can  be  quantified,  indicators  are  always  reductive:  for 
example, in France, in order to measure the success of a cluster, in terms of building up a 
network for example, the number of “members” is counted. But this indicator does not take 
into  account  the  number  of  “sleeping”  partners  and  can  have  the  perverse  effect  of 
encouraging directors to “recruit” members without examining the degree to which they are 
committed to the activities of the cluster. It is for this reason for example, that in Austria, the 
level of “participation” of member firms in administrative bodies and collective events is 
measured. But have we really measured the phenomena, namely the construction of a network 
of actors?  
 
In  terms  of  measurement,  specific  categories  and  instruments  are  often  elaborated  a 
posteriori, especially in that objectives defined by clusters evolve over time. This explains the 
highly  “traditional”  nature  of  recurrent  indicators  in  national  statistical  systems  and  the 
difficulties  inherent  in  longitudinal  and  comparative  studies,  already  noted  by  the  BIPE 
(2007), using more accurate indicators. It should be noted that it was possible to carry out a 
more objective impact analysis in Germany, based on an economic indicator (added value), 
for two reasons: firstly, a sufficient period of time had elapsed between the implementation of 
the policy and the evaluation, and, secondly, the programme itself (the competitions) made it 
possible to compare the performances of subsidised and non-subsidised regions in the same 
sector (biotechnology). On the other hand, the Belgium encountered the same problems as 
France. 
 
Lastly, the process of elaboration of indicators is influenced by question of the parameters of 
cluster activities. Should the activities of all member companies and research centres be taken 
into  account  when  measuring  the  economic  activity  of  an  individual  cluster?  Is  there  an 




5.2. The question of measuring and imputing results  
 
Cluster evaluation raises the crucial question of what a result is and for which actors. In 
effect,  relatively  contrasting  points  of  view  are  possible  depending  on  whether  clusters’ 
“clients” are thought to consist of enterprises whose productivity is to be increased, or the 
“collectivity”  (the  region  or  the  nation,  for  example).  France,  Belgium,  Finland  and  to  a 
certain extent Germany focus to some degree on the impact on the collectivity, while Austria 
places more emphasis on the satisfaction of enterprises by producing surveys on their clients. 
This difference in perspective can considerably modify views concerning performance.  
 
Furthermore,  the  notion  of  performance  is  highly  polysemic  and  never  precise.  All  the 
evaluations  we  examined  classify  performance  into  different  categories  (scientific,  HR, 
economic, etc.) and, within each category, attempt to objectivise it in different ways. There 
are few common elements: turnover generated by cluster projects, the number of jobs or 
enterprises (created, safeguarded, attracted), the number of patents lodged by members of the 
cluster.  These  are  some  of  the  indicators  used  by  the  French  assessors,  CMI-BCG,  as  a 
foundation for future cluster evaluations in France.  
 
The variety of approaches to performance raises the question – a traditional one in terms of 
evaluations – of the distinction between “end” results, or impacts, and “intermediate” results. 
Thus, in the French case, evaluators prudently assessed intermediate results (for example, 
joint R&D projects and the way in which governance was structured) but did not examine the 
end results habitually analysed (in terms of enterprises and/or jobs created), which could not 
be observed over such a short space of time (Pentikäinen 2000).  
 
Naturally enough, an analysis of various evaluation approaches shows that the more recent the 
programmes, the more the evaluation concentrates on intermediate results (the number of 
projects, the quality and cost of projects, the number of joint-projects, etc.) and on analyses of 
processes and resources, as we have seen in the case of Belgium and France. On the other 
hand, evaluations carried out later in the process, as in Germany, tend to focus essentially on 
end results, with assessors taking the view that these are the only results that count (Staehler 
et al. 2007). 
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As well as measuring cluster performance, we are faced with the question of the schemas of 
the causality underlying the choice of criteria and phenomena observed. These schemas are 
not always explicit and, at any event, are often open to question. This is not surprising in 
terms of an analysis of such systemic dynamics. But it clearly makes interpretation, based as 
it is on indicators, a more delicate affair. 
 
For  example,  the  supposed  casual  link  R&D    innovation    competitiveness  is  not  a 
determinist one. Joint research projects can have significantly different impacts, sometimes 
immediately visible (when they lead to commercially successful innovations), sometimes less 
so  if  they  merely  contribute  to  the  development  of  networks  encompassing  new  actors. 
Moreover, a number of joint projects are in effect opportunistic coalitions between actors 
designed  to  attract  extra  funding  for  projects  that  they  intend  to  pursue  anyway  (see  the 
Finnish case). In France, assessors have observed that newly established clusters “destock” 
existing R&D projects with a view to attracting funding.   
 
An essential question in terms of the imputability of results revolves around the “inherited” 
characteristics of clusters (the nature of partners and the ways in which they were previously 
linked, the ways in which they cooperated and innovated, etc.), as well as the way in which 
they influence the results of the cluster compared to the voluntarist actions of governance, its 
mode  of  organisation  and  the  suitability  of  support  mechanisms  (notably  financial 
mechanisms)  linked  to  national  policy.  It  is  clear  that  these  schemas  of  causality,  while 
convincing, have not been verified and that, in our opinion, one of the main functions of the 
evaluation of cluster policies is to test, enrich and even contest them.  
 
Nevertheless,  the  importance  of  the  question  of  the  imputability  of  results  varies  from 
evaluation  to  evaluation.  The  German  approach  focuses  on  end  results,  most  of  them 
economic in nature. It emphasises a conception of the policy and of clusters in general based 
on results and does not really examine the black box of organisation and the mechanisms 
making it possible to develop clusters. This approach could be summed up in the phrase “the 
ends are more important than the means.” In this case, potential for analysing imputability is 
reduced.   
 
On the other hand, the evaluation carried out in Austria focused on the assessment of cluster 
management without attempting to measure economic impact. A central role is accorded to 25 
 
relational  indicators  and  participation  in  cluster  projects.  Such  a  focus  on  management 
suggests that the question of causality does not arise. The approach presupposes that relevant 
factors  explaining  the  development  of  a  cluster  are  known.  If  those  factors  are  correctly 
aligned, the cluster will be successful. In other words, it seems that the bodies responsible for 
overseeing the evaluation believe that action theory is relevant to cluster management and that 
it should only be applied to evaluating management.  
 
The French solution, which consists in assessing intermediate results (research projects, etc.) 
and the way in which clusters are run, does not have the capacity to interact directly with 
cluster management and seems to represent an intermediary approach between the two cases 
presented  above.  It  reveals  that  even  if  the  policy  is  based  on  a  number  of  hypotheses 
concerning  the  imputability  of  results,  such  as  the  notion  that  the  development  of  joint 
research  projects  will  help  to  create  a  local  dynamic,  its  intention  is,  by  means  of  the 
evaluation, to verify the link between management and results. 
 
In our view, taking into account the knowledge of the dynamic of the clusters, which, as we 
know, is deployed over relatively long timescales, is one of the most important issues in terms 
of future evaluations, in that it should make it possible to examine “end” results.  
 
 
5.3. The question of the diversity of clusters  
 
Evaluating the performance of clusters implies taking into account a wide variety of different 
situations. As the evaluation confirmed, competitiveness clusters in France do not follow the 
same operational model. Nor do they have the same resources, the same configuration in 
terms  of  actors,  or  the  same  level  of  maturity.  For  example,  some  clusters,  with  a  long 
tradition  of  working  in  tandem  with  research  centres  or  working  on  the  basis  of  sub-
ensembles have had little difficulty in adopting the kind of research-industry collaboration 
model proposed. 
 
Nevertheless, not only do the public authorities consider that they are obliged to evaluate the 
policy on the national level, in that substantial public funds are poured into it, they also 
believe  that  the  evaluation  should  be  organised  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  possible  a 
comparison between individual clusters, a source of potential emulation and, above all, of 26 
 
learning for the actors piloting the policy and for the clusters themselves. Whence a unique 
evaluation framework which, in the view of certain clusters, has failed to take into account a 
number of specificities. Can the lack of emphasis on diversity in evaluations carried out in the 
four European countries mentioned in this study be explained by a lack of desire to assess all 
the clusters, with each case considered specifically? Although the point is an important one, it 
should nevertheless be pointed out that diversity is less of an issue in the evaluation of sector-
based policies – as in Germany and Finland.  
 
 
5.4. Links between evaluations and political decisions 
 
As we have already pointed out, evaluations not only focus on policy but also on development 
issues. In this section, we examine the political decisions taken in these two fields following 
the evaluation. 
 
The impact of the cluster policy evaluation 
 
The various evaluations considered in this paper all led to the renewal of cluster policies. 
However,  a  number  of  improvements  were  suggested.  In  France,  for  example,  potential 
improvements  included  a  clearer  definition  of  development  strategy  and  shorter  payment 
terms once funding has been granted; in Germany, an amelioration in the financial situation of 
biotechnology companies; or in Finland, more involvement in joint-projects on the part of 
enterprises. 
 
Most evaluations also emphasised the need for continuous and systematic data in order to 
make future assessments easier. In this regard it should be noted that, in Austria, cluster 
managers  provide  a  highly  accurate  report  on  their  activities.  In  France,  the  performance 
contract  between  clusters  and  the  public  authorities  (State,  Region)  includes  the 
implementation of systematic annual indicators. Nevertheless, as we have already pointed out, 
this  raises  the  issue  of  the  independence  of  evaluations  in  which  stakeholders  furnish  a 
number of their own performance indicators. 
 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  evaluations  should  be  thought  of  as  instruments  suitable  for 
examining potential policy evolutions rather than as a kind of sword of Damocles threatening 
the very existence of the policy itself. Thus, for example, in France, the continuation of the 27 
 
policy was announced a year before the publication of the results of the evaluation. Although 
evaluations increase knowledge about clusters and the way in which they function, decisions 
concerning public policy are a matter for the political establishment. 
 
The impact of evaluations on clusters  
 
Approaches to cluster evaluation differed in each of the countries studied. As we have already 
mentioned, the evaluation carried out in France eventually led to six clusters having their 
accreditation revoked. It should be noted that, according to French policy, clusters must be 
accredited – or, in other words, recognised as competitiveness clusters – in order to acquire 
public funding for both operational and research purposes. Without such accreditation, the 
ability  of  clusters  to  apply  for  public  funding  is  substantially  curtailed.  Furthermore, 
accreditation provides a degree of legitimacy and visibility to local actors vis-à-vis national 
actors such as the CNRS, which consequently take an interest in their research activities. On 
the other hand, the government has no direct influence on the organisation of clusters or on 
their employees. For example, teams of employees have no hierarchical links with the public 
authorities. Revoking accreditation is there the only way in which the public authorities can 
exert an influence on clusters regarded as inefficient. The Wallonia region has adopted a 
similar procedure and evaluation there led to the disaccreditation of two clusters.  
 
A major difference between the two cases can, however, be observed in the decision-making 
process.  The  French  evaluation  identified  thirteen  clusters  “which  could  benefit  from  a 
thoroughgoing overhaul.” They were given a year to propose a new mode of organisation to 
the public authorities. Eventually, two years after the evaluation, six of the thirteen clusters 
had their accreditation revoked. While the poorly rated clusters appreciated that fact that they 
had been given a “second chance”, they considered that the time limits concerning the final 
decision  were  far  too  long,  a  situation  which  wrought  havoc  in  terms  of  motivation.  In 
Belgium, on the other hand, the decision to revoke accreditation was immediate, which, while 
making any form of restructuring impossible, seems to have rendered the policy a good deal 
more effective. The situation in Austria is somewhat different. Two kinds of sanction are 
applied: on the one hand, clusters can either have their accreditation revoked or be merged 
with  another  cluster  (there  are  similarities  with  the  situation  described  above)  when  the 
“demand” of such a cluster is not given any more, or, on the other hand, the sanction can also 
focus on the cluster manager since the cluster umbrella body has the power to fire him or her 28 
 
if it considers that results are not up to scratch. This course of action cannot be taken in 
France,  Germany  or  Belgium  where  there  are  no  hierarchical  links  between  the  national 
government and the associations which manage the clusters.  
 
The impact of the two mechanisms is this different in nature. In the first case, the sanction 
falls on the entire region and on all the actors involved. There can thus be major consequences 
not only in terms of the visibility and image of the region concerned but also of the dynamism 
and  motivations  of  local  actors  (enterprises,  research  centres  and  local  authorities).  The 
psychological  and  economic  impacts  of  the  decision  could  constitute  a  double  sanction 
consisting in a loss of access to public funding and a loss of visibility and legitimacy. In 
Austria, the operations team or its manager can be sanctioned by being fired, an approach 
which presupposes that poor results are the result of a lack of professional competence. Such 
a procedure does not call into question the dynamism of the actors or any potential future joint 
projects. 
 
In conclusion, the French case also differs from the evaluation of the BioRegios policy. In 
effect, this last were assessed in an ex post manner, almost two years after having been set up. 
Furthermore, the BioRegions policy is funded by means of the payment of an initial lump 
sum. It is thus impossible to envisage any ex post sanctions in case of failure. Instead, it is a 
question of identifying what kind of policy should be renewed.  
 
There are thus two different conceptions of the role of evaluations. In France, Austria, Finland 
and Belgium, evaluation appears to be a tool amongst other for steering clusters, even if the 
methods applied to that goal differ. Evaluation models of this type tend to focus on assessing 
ongoing activities. In Germany, evaluation is characterised by a more traditional approach in 
the sense that it is basically an ex post operation independent of the policy sphere. It would 
thus seem that the German approach is based to a substantial degree on what has been termed 
the  “ballistic”  (Padioleau,  1982)  or  “epidemiological”  (Stame,  2009)  model,  according  to 
which evaluation is the last link in the chain of a process of public action designed to be 






The comparison of different evaluation approaches presented above demonstrates that rather 
than a unique model there exist a range of different conceptions. Our empirical comparative 
work does not offer sufficient material to propose different evaluation models. Nevertheless, 
we have been able to isolate a number of discriminating factors. 
 
The desire, or otherwise, to break into the cluster’s “black box” constitutes an initial element 
of  differentiation.  France  has  made  this  choice;  the  country’s  approach  is  based  on  a 
centralised  mechanism  for  piloting  clusters  and  evaluation  makes  it  possible  to  examine 
clusters’ internal workings. Austria and Germany take a different approach; the evaluations 
carried out in those two countries do no break into the black box. In Germany, the purpose of 
evaluation is to assess economic results ex post. In Austria, evaluation is designed to measure 
management performance largely by means of client satisfaction surveys, an approach which 
could be characterised as a delegation model. This difference in approach may signal the first 
steps in the appropriation of the question of evaluation by management researchers focusing 
on the piloting of clusters rather than, like economists, on their economic performance.  
 
Furthermore, it seems that the kind of one-off evaluations carried out in France and Germany 
can  be  contrasted  with  the  type  of  continuous  evaluation  applied  in  Austria.  In  one-off 
evaluations, unique evaluations (as in Germany) can be distinguished from the periodical 
approach characteristic of France, where a second evaluation will be undertaken in 2012. The 
objectives and levers of these evaluations differ from one another. In Austria, evaluation is 
designed  to  contribute  to  piloting  cluster  projects.  Nevertheless,  the  Austrian  approach  is 
reminiscent of an operation designed to monitor the activity of employees. 
 
Moreover, evaluations can be carried with a view to measuring performace from the point of 
view  of  the  collectivity  or  from  that  of  member  companies.  Methods,  instruments  and 
indicators vary. The results of such evaluations will be put to different uses. The choice 
reveals two conceptions of the purpose of clusters: either to contribute to developing the 




Lastly, it is useful to recall that assessments can focus on end results, as in Germany, where 
the purpose of the evaluation is purely to accumulate knowledge, since it can have no direct 
effect on policy. This form of evaluation is based on the canonical ex post, independent model 
the purpose of which is to ensure that public funds are being put to good use. This traditional 
conception  of  evaluation  can  be  contrasted  with  another  approach  which  seems  to  be 
developing  around  clusters  and  which  has  been  qualified  as  the  “chemin  faisant”  (or 
gradualist) approach (Fen Chong, 2009). This conception, adopted in France and Belgium, 
and to a certain degree in Austria, uses evaluation as a tool (amongst others) with which to 
pilot clusters. The approach is, generally speaking, relatively experimental, and should be 
useful in terms of evaluating the mechanics of individual clusters.  
 
The  summary  of  the  differences  between  the  five  evaluations  examined  in  this  paper 
highlights the complexity inherent in assessing cluster policy. The five differentiation criteria 
identified here may or may not be independent or compatible. Thus, the decision concerning 
whether or not to enter the black box is correlated with the nature of the results measured. 
But, in regard to this question, it can be observed that France, Germany and Austria opted for 
different  evaluation  approaches.  It  is  thus  evident  that  different  criteria  can  lead  to  the 
development of different models. It would nevertheless seem that a major issue in evaluation 
is whether to assess end results or intermediate results. Conceptions of the role of evaluation 
and the methodologies applied to it vary substantially. In order to meet the demands of the 
bodies requesting evaluations, assessors must take this variety of criteria into account.  
 
This  paper  has  shown  that  there  is  no  unique  evaluation  model  for  clusters.  Indeed,  our 
empirical analysis demonstrates the existence of a variety of differentiation criteria. The paper 
is nevertheless characterised by a number of limitations. Firstly, due to a relative lack of 
documentation concerning evaluations of clusters outside France, it was not possible to affect 
an exhaustive comparison of the various approaches. Moreover, this study confirms that the 
term “cluster” covers a multiplicity of notions, a fact which makes comparison more difficult. 
However, even taking such issues into account, it is probable that a sytematic and wide-
ranging  analysis  of  cluster  evaluations  could  lead  to  the  emergence  of  new  models  of 
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Four cluster programmes: 
Wood Cluster, Wellbeing 
Cluster, Ecological 
Construction Cluster, 
Automotive Clutser Vienna 
Region 
The BioRegio and BioProfile 
competitions 
Two cluster programmes: 
1. “Forest Cluster Research 
Programme (Wood 
Wisdom)” and  
2. “Well-Being cluster 
programme” 
The cluster policy and the 
current situation of the 71 
clusters 
“Pilot Programme” and the 
current situation of four 
“pilot clusters” 
Policy objective 
The Cluster Management 
Teams: 
-  interface with the public 
sector 
-  help enterprises to develop 
their projects and ideas 
- arrange joint projects 
- provide aid and advice in 
terms of project development 
- provide a qualifications 
offer 
- help members to break into 
international markets  
The setting up, by means of 
the integration of 
biotechnology capacities and 
programmes, of a dynamic 
process of innovation 
designed to initiate the 
commercialisation of modern 
biotechnology in Germany 
(cluster creation) (see p. 4) 
1. The setting up of a new, 
permanent cooperative 
structure 
2. Improving the cooperative 
aspect of the research system 
3. Increasing the relevance 
and flexibility of projects 
 Ultimate objective: “to 
generate growth, improve 
industries’ competiveness 
and productivity, increase 
employment, generate new 
innovations and improve 
social welfare” (p. 60) 
“The programme is intended 
to boost the competitiveness 
of the French economy and 
to create growth and jobs in 
promising markets: 
- by developing innovation; 
- by boosting essentially 
industrial activities with a 
high degree of technological 
content and by setting up 
enterprises in the French 
territories; 
- by making France more 




The programme is intended 
to provide “stimulus in terms 
of encouraging companies to 
exploit this potential and 
facilitate the implementation 
of initiatives creating the 
conditions required for 
promising interactions 
between firms.” (p. 85) 
Scope  Regional (Lower Austria)  National  National  National  Regional (Wallonia) 
Period 
evaluated  2001-2004  BioRegio competition: 1996 
BioProfile competition: 1999  1997-1999  2005-2007  2000-2003 
Date of the 
evaluation  2004  2005-2007  2000  2008  2004 
                                                 
****** Kalcher, T., Piber, H., & Gruber, M. (2004) & Information Brochure of EcoPlus : « Wenn Sie für neue Ziele neue Partner Suchen : Netzwerke und Cluster von ecoplus 
» 
†††††† Staehler, Dohse & Cooke (2007)  
‡‡‡‡‡‡ Pentikäinen (2000); the evaluation focuses primarily on the Wood Wisdom and Well-Being cluster programme, but the other programmes are also mentioned.  
§§§§§§ CM International, & BCG. (2008) 
******* Nauwelares and Pellegrin (2004); the “technologies groupings” pilot programme was also evaluated in the work of Nauwelares and Pellegrin (2004). 
††††††† http://competitivite.gouv.fr/politique-des-poles-471.html (consulted on 15/07/2010) 35 
 
 
  Austria  Germany  Finland  France  Belgium 
Objectives of 
the evaluation 
The objective of the 
evaluation was to provide a 
motivation for improving 
cluster policy in Lower 
Austria. 
A quantitative and macro-
economic evaluation of the 
programme: 
The measurable successes of 
the competition strategy 
(added value). 
A mixed micro-economic 
evaluation of the 
programme: 
1. General description of the 
programmes 
2. Coherence of the 
programmes with the 
intermediate and final 
objectives of the cluster 
policy 
3. Analysis of financial and 
organisational instruments 
4. Effectiveness and added 
value of the programmes 
 
Secondary examination of 
the availibility of data in 
view of a more far-reaching 
evaluation 
1. Evaluation of national 




- Initial effects 
 
2. Evaluation of each 
individual competitiveness 
cluster: 
- Specific analysis by cluster 
taking into account the 
history of collaborations, the 
local and international 
context and available 
funding. 
Mixed micro-economic 
evaluation of the 
programme: 
1. Quantitative analysis of 
the member enterprises of 
the four clusters 
2. Evaluation qualitative des 
4 clusters 
3. Evaluation des 
programmes  
 